The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments (Friday, February 8, 1788)
This essay examines Madison's thoughts on the division of governmental power among multiple departments. Madison assumed in most of his writings that conflicts of interests are natural to humans, and he recognized that, as a consequence, people fall into various groups. He therefore wanted to avoid a situation in which any one group completely controlled the decision-making process. Free elections and the majority principle protected the country from dictatorship. However, Madison was equally concerned about the danger that he thought was more likely in a democracy: the tyranny of the majority. A central philosophical issue for him was how to minimize this risk. Madison's solution relied not only on formal institutions but on a system of checks and balances within the government. Such an arrangement would provide different groups with multiple access points to the government while preventing any one branch of the government from exercising power over the other branches.
To the People of the State of New York:
To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view.
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority -- that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.
PUBLIUS[James Madison]
Document Analysis
According to Madison, which branch of government should dominate in a republic?
How are Madisons ideas applied in the contemporary U.S. government? Give examples.
According to Madison, what are the two potential sources of oppression in a country? How does the U.S. system of government guard against both dangers?
Madison says that naturally in a republican government the legislative branch should dominate over the others.He says continually that the legislative branch should also be divided and the different divisions be independent from each other.
In the government today there are different branches of government, they all also act basically independently from each other.The members of all are elected by the people.And the legislative branch has many sections and sublevels to it.
The first that he describes is that the power of the people is given to one power, and therefore it is oppressive to the people.You can remedy this by creating two government powers that take the power, and then govern each other and themselves independently.Second he describes that the classes would be harmful to each other.That the wants of the majority will always out weigh the wants of the minority.You can solve this by breaking the majority into so many parties and different interests that they all are different and can not collectively unite against the minorities.
1. Madison feels that in a republic form of government, the legislative branch should dominate. He thinks the legislative branch should be split up into even smaller branches of government to help distribute the ruling weight the legislative branch carries. 2. Madison fears a tyrannal government and belivevs in a republic just like modern day government. He also believes in the system of checks and balances, where the three branches of goverment check on each other to make sure the power is balanced between them. 3. Madison fears that all of the power could leave the poeple and end up in the hands of a central government. His solution to the problem is having these many different branches and systems of government to balance everything out. He also fears the situation of which a country is divided over a decision and the rights of the minority in the decision aren't protected. This can be solved by comprmises between the majority and the minority.
gonna go listen to some music now and then i will probably eat
1. According to Madison, the legislative branch should dominate and rule over the government. In addtion to the legislative branch governing the people, he feels it should be split into smaller groups and branches that way it is governed by equal power.
2. Similaries in both today's government and the government from the past would be the checks and balances and the separation of powers, that was kept so that one group of government wouldn't have too much power over the people, and a monarchial government would not come back into existence.
3. The two sources of opression in a country is when all power is given to one person to rule a country and all balance would be nonexistent. The second source of opression would come from split governments which didn't agree on anything. They would break up the country and we would not all together be an entire nation. We are protected because of the system of checks and balances and not one group can make decisions without the other group's approval.
According to Madison the legislative branch should dominate in a republic because it makes laws for the entire country.He also says to make up for this predominance it should be divided into different branches of which their members should be elected differently and have different responsibilities to try to keep each branch as separated from the other as possible.
In the present U.S. government his ideas of checks and balances have been applied.We see that there are three branches of government: Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive.Each of these three branches have some authority to act apart from the other two and each of these branches have some power to regulate the others.All of these branches also have different departments governing and checking each other to further regulate authority even within themselves.For example the Congress is the legislative branch and is divided into two parts, the House of Representatives and the Senate and for a law to made, both chambers must consent.
The first potential source of oppression is that in a republic the people as a whole give their power to a central government which could abuse it.To protect against this the U.S. government splits the government into two distinct governments which the power is divided between and then divided even more by use of distinct and separate departments within each.The second potential source of oppression is the different classes of citizens which harbor different interests.In the U.S. government both the interests of civil rights and religious freedom must be equal.This can be achieved because the society which gives authority is so diverse that each part only has so much power which keeps from one part from having more power than the others.
Madison believes that the legislative branch should be the dominate force in a republic. He explains that the legislative branch will dominate out of necessity but he believes that they should not be given full power and that to control some of their power that they should be divided into two different branches working independent of each other
Madisons ideas are evident in todays government.The government of today is established on a system of checks and balances.The government is divided into three branches the Executive , the Legislative and the Judicial.The legislative branch today is separated into two groups, the Senate and the House of Representatives, just as Madison suggested.In this paper Madison also states that with the two legislative groups holding most of the power that the executive group may be weakened.With this he suggest that the executive branch have the power to overrule the legislative branch and this is in place today in the form of Presidential veto power.
The first source of oppression that Madison describes is a powerful individual government, which would cause the people to be powerless.His idea to split the power of government among three different branches in order to have a government of checks and balances and shared power.The second potential source of oppression is one part of society causing injustice on the other part of society.Madison believes that if a majority can reduce the rights of a minority.This danger can be reduced by breaking the majority down into many different groups and interests so that one group does not dominate.
According to Madison, which branch of government should dominate in a republic?
Madison believes that the legislative branch of government should dominate the republic. He also states that the legislative branch should be broken down into smaller parts to make it more equal so that the common people can be represented better.
How are Madisons ideas applied in the contemporary U.S. government? Give examples.
Some of Madisons ideas are applied in todays government, for example the three branches which are judicial, legislative, executive. Also that the branches work in a separate yet, connective way. Also how the people have some say in voting and electing officials to represent them.
According to Madison, what are the two potential sources of oppression in a country? How does the U.S. system of government guard against both dangers?
Two potential sources of oppression in a country according to Madison are one; the rights of the average person would be taken away by one powerful person who could potentially cause distress among the citizens throughout the country. This is why Madison suggested a government with many branches to equalize the power. The second was an uprising of a conflict within the country; the feuding classes would be the citizens and the leaders.
According to Madison, which branch of government should dominate in a republic?
In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. says Madison. Although he states that the legislature should have more power than the others, their powers should and must be checked by dividing the legislative powers into different branches, and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.
How are Madisons ideas applied in the contemporary U.S. government? Give examples. Madison contributed to the Contemporary U.S. Gov. by implementing the idea of the separation of powers between the three branches to prevent a totalitarian government and not give the majority dominance over the rights of the minority. As Madison said you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. In incorporating Madisons idea of separated powers the U.S. Gov. also used his idea of a separated legislature in the form of a bicameral legislature (Senate and House of Reps.)
According to Madison, what are the two potential sources of oppression in a country? How does the U.S. system of government guard against both dangers?
He believed that all power that is not given or seized by the people, and is therefore seized by a single and (indivisible) centralized government; and the dominion of major over minor groups are the two potential sources within a country.
Madison believed that the legislative branch should be the most powerful, but they should not be given full power and that power should be divided among two groups.
Madisons ideas are much like those of today's government. Just as Madison suggested the legislative branch is separated into two groups. Madison also believed that with most of the power power being in the legislative branch the executive branch should be able to keep them in check.
The first source of oppression is one person ruling and making the people's voice go unheard. The way to gaurd from this was to split the power of government among three different branches.The second potential source of oppression is if the majority can reduce the rights of a minority.This can be gaurded from happening by spliting up the majority down into many different groups.
1. In a republic, its expected that the legislature will dominate. The remedy to this inconvenience says Madison, is to divide the legislature into different branches and render them as little connected to each other as society will admit. 2. The system of relations between the branches of government, known as the separation of powers, is one staple of U.S. government introduced by Madison. Another is a legislative branch divided in powers; in contemporary American politics known as the Senate and House of Representatives. 3. The two potential sources of oppression in a country, as described by Madison are: the tyranny of rulers or a centralized government, and the majority-minority relationship in society. The U.S. system of checks and balances guards the nation against the former of the two potentials. According to Madison, you can alleviate the threat of the latter by having a heterogeneous society in which the society itself will be broken down into so many classes, parts, and interests that the rights of individuals will be in little danger of interested combinations of the majority.
1. James madison believes that a republic should dominate the government. A republic splits up the legislatures into different branch's. This gives the legislatures less power. He does not think that any branch should out law another brance.
2.The government that James Madison is talking about is simalar to the government today because we still use checks and balences which is basicly a system to prevent one branch of government to become surpreme and to have the branches of government to cooperate.
3. First Madison fears that the power will leave the people and go to a central government and to defend that the government was split up into different branches and used checks and balances to prevent any branch to become more powerful. Second Madison feared that the majority would rule out the minoritys. He prevented this by splitting up the majority into different branch's.
1. The legislative branch will dominate in a rebublic. Even though he thinks this should dominate he doesnt think it should be given full power. He also thinks it should be divided.
2. Madisons ideas are used in todays government alot. For example the division of powers into the 3 different branches. This is so that no group has more power than the other. The system of checks and balances is also part of todays government.
3. One potential source of oppression in a country is when one person or government is given all the power to rule. The U.S prevents this by dividing the power to different branches of government. Another source of oppression would be a fight within the country caused by different views and opinions from the people in the country. The U.S prevents this by making the government take in all the views of the people and taking them into concideration.
According to Madison, which branch of government should dominate in a republic?
Madison believed that the legislative branch should dominate a republic but under certain conditions. To increase the security of individual rights he believed that the legislative branch should also be seperated into seperate branches with equal power, with a system of checks and balances on one another.
How are Madisons ideas applied in the contemporary U.S. government? Give examples.
Madison's ideas are fully employed in our modern government. His ideas on a system of branches, and checks and balances have been used for centuries. Madisons idea of checks and balances has worked for a long time and is in my opinion very successful. Also his idea for a legislative branch with more than 1 part is also used.
According to Madison, what are the two potential sources of oppression in a country? How does the U.S. system of government guard against both dangers?
According to the beliefs of James Madison there are two potential sorces of oppresion in any country. The first is an overly powerful central governement because it squashes the rights of the citizens. The Constitution protects against this by providing a system where there are certain rights allowed to each states government, those rights alloted to the national government and those that are collaborative between the two. The second potential source of oppresion is a system of branches in a government that are completley seperate because they may not agree on particular issues and it can split the nation. The American safeguard is Madisons idea on a system of checks and balances so that the branches are connected on nearly every issue and it prevents any one system from having more power than the other two.
1. According to James Madison, the legislative branch should dominate a republican government. To double the security of the people he came up with a sytem of checks and balances, which gives every branch power but also prevents one branch from overpowering the branches. 2. Madison's ideas of the legislative branch being broken into more than one part and dominating in a republic government still apply today. Also his idea about checks and balances is still used and it seems to have worked. 3. According to Madison, the first source of oppression is rulers and one part of society having complete power over the rest of the society. The division of powers between the branches of government prevents this from happening. The second source is the majority trying to reduce the rights of the minority. Since different classes of citizens have different interests, if you seperate the majority into different groups they won't be able to agree enough to overpower the minority.
and then i will probably eat 
